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Making Carbon Taxation a Generational Win Win
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Felix Kubler, Andrey Polbin, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Simon Scheidegger




Carbon taxation has been studied primarily in social planner or infinitely lived agent models, 
which trade off the welfare of future and current generations. Such frameworks obscure the 
potential for carbon taxation to produce a generational win-win. This paper develops a large-
scale, dynamic 55-period, OLG model to calculate the carbon tax policy delivering the highest 
uniform welfare gain to all generations. The OLG framework, with its selfish generations, seems 
far more natural for studying climate damage. Our model features coal, oil, and gas, each 
extracted subject to increasing costs, a clean energy sector, technical and demographic change, 
and Nordhaus (2017)’s temperature/damage functions. Our model’s optimal uniform welfare 
increasing (UWI) carbon tax starts at $30 tax, rises annually at 1.5 percent and raises the welfare 
of all current and future generations by 0.73 percent on a consumption-equivalent basis. Sharing 
efficiency gains evenly requires, however, taxing future generations by as much as 8.1 percent 
and subsidizing early generations by as much as 1.2 percent of lifetime consumption. Without 
such redistribution (the Nordhaus “optimum”), the carbon tax constitutes a win-lose policy with 
current generations experiencing an up to 0.84 percent welfare loss and future generations 
experiencing an up to 7.54 percent welfare gain. With a six-times larger damage function, the 
optimal UWI initial carbon tax is $70, again rising annually at 1.5 percent. This policy raises all 
generations’ welfare by almost 5 percent. However, doing so requires levying taxes on and giving 
transfers to future and current generations ranging up to 50.1 percent and 10.3 percent of their 
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Climate change presents grave risks to current and future generations. The perils include
drought, extreme storms, floods, a rise in sea level, intense heat, wildfires, pollution, deser-
tification, the spread of disease, earthquakes, tsunamis, a rise in ocean acidity, the proliferation
of insects, and mass extinctions. Anthropogenic global warming, associated with the human
release of carbon into the atmosphere, is widely viewed as the primary cause of climate change.
According to NASA1, carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased by one third since 1950
and is now at its highest level in 650,000 years. Since 1880, the planet’s average temperature
has risen by 1.8 degrees, minimum levels of Arctic ice are declining by 12.8 percent per decade,
413 gigatonnes of ice sheets are melting annually, and the sea level may rise 8 feet by 2100.
The 2018 U.S. Government’s National Climate Assessment projected potentially massive costs
to the economy, the eco-system, health, infrastructure, and the environment.2 Recent estimates
put 2100 climate damages at one quarter of global GDP.3
Inspired by Sachs (2014), this paper develops a large-scale OLG climate-change model to
realistically assess the potential generational win-wins available from carbon taxation. The OLG
model appears better suited for studying carbon taxation than the standard frameworks – the
social planner and infinitely-lived agent models. In the OLG framework, generations are selfish.
Hence, their imposition of negative externalities on future generations comes naturally. The
OLG framework also highlights a key point that has been obscured in all but a few analyses of
carbon taxation. Carbon taxation, coupled with appropriate intergenerational redistribution, can
make all current and future generations better off. Indeed, it can make them uniformly better
off.
Our OLG model has 55 overlapping generations. A single consumption good (corn) is pro-
duced with capital (unconsumed corn), labor, and energy. Energy is clean or dirty. Clean energy
is produced using capital, labor, and fixed natural resources (e.g., windy areas), which is prox-
ied by land. Labor and land are in fixed supply. Corn and clean energy experience technical
change (TFP growth), which can proceed at permanently different rates. Apart from our energy
supply side and OLG preferences, our model matches Nordhaus’(2017). In particular, it adopts
Nordhaus’ modeling of carbon emissions, temperature change, and temperature-induced eco-




In one of our models below, which features an extremely large, but, unfortunately, highly plausible damage
function, we produce climate damages of this order of magnitude.
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assumptions about its distribution by birth cohort.
As in Golosov et al. (2014), we explicitly model dirty energies, in our case coal, oil, and
natural gas.4 Each has finite reserves and each is subject to increasing extraction cost. We
use Auerbach and Kotlikoff’s (1987) lump-sum redistribution authority (LSRA) to derive the
largest uniform (across all current and future generations) welfare increasing (UWI) carbon
tax, where welfare changes are measured as compensating consumption differentials. We also
present results for two alternative means of distributing efficiency gains from controlling CO2
emissions. The first allocates all efficiency gains uniformly to current generations (the born).
The second allocates efficiency gains uniformly to future generations (the unborn). Depending
on the size of damages, optimal carbon policy can depend on how efficiency gains are shared.
Calculating Pareto improvements is standard procedure for determining optimal policy re-
sponses to negative externalities. Anthropomorphic climate change is arguably the planet’s
worst negative externality. Yet ours appears to be the first large-scale study of Pareto improv-
ing carbon taxation. Standard integrated assessment models, e.g., Nordhaus (2017), maximize
the welfare of a social planner (SP). Other models, e.g., Golosov et al. (2014), examine optimal
taxation in infinitely-lived agent (ILA) models. There is no guarantee the SP’s "optimal" carbon
tax policy will achieve a generational win-win since it pays no heed to the initial intergener-
ational distribution of welfare. Indeed, the SP would, even in the absence of carbon damage,
use carbon policy to redistribute intergenerationally to achieve what, to the SP, is a preferable
distribution of welfare across generations. For its part, the infinitely-lived agent model relies,
implicitly, on intergenerational altruism (see Barro (1974)). However, such altruism begs the
question of why appropriate climate policy is not already in place.5 The choice of OLG versus
ILA frameworks would be of little importance for carbon policy if both frameworks produced
identical or very similar policy prescriptions. This is not the case. Indeed, depending on the
rate of time preference and the magnitude of climate damages, the two frameworks can produce
dramatically different optimal carbon policies with the ILA policy potentially harming some
generations to help others.
4Golosov et al. (2014) combine oil and natural gas.
5Yes, infinitely lived dynasties would try to free ride on other dynasties both within and across regions.
But, as shown by Kotlikoff (1983) and Bernheim and Bagwell (1988), intermarriage between altruistic dynasties
produces altruistic linkages across dynasties, which eliminate the free rider problem. One can also question the
ILA framework on empirical grounds. See, in this regard, Altonji et al. (1997), Altonji et al. (1992), Hayashi
et al. (1996), Abel and Kotlikoff (1994), and Gokhale et al. (1996).
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1.1 Overview of Findings
Under our baseline, business-as-usual (BAU) calibration, climate damages are initially 0.2 per-
cent of output, peaking in year 130 at 7.7 percent of output. Dirty energy represents 97 percent
of total energy in year 0, 86 percent in year 50, 46 percent in year 100, and zero percent after
year 130, when the value of additional dirty energy extraction exceeds its cost.6 Relative to
their initial stocks, BAU extraction reduces, by year 130, coal, oil, and gas reserves by 70, 75,
and 85 percent, respectively. Hence, BAU entails burning most of the planet’s fossil fuels. Our
BAU simulation also predicts that gas production will rise over the next 20 years and then
steadily decline, coal production will rise over the next 45 years and then sharply decline, and
oil production will fall for 20 years, rise for the following 40 years, and then gradually fall
through year 130. These surprising dynamics reflect the different extraction cost functions for
gas, coal, and oil as well as the precise dynamics of the price of energy.
Given the significant uncertainty (see Lontzek et al. (2015)) surrounding climate damage,
we also consider larger damage functions where the quadratic coefficient in Nordhaus (2017)’s
damage function is multiplied by either 3 or 6. Below, we refer, admittedly loosely, to the three
damages functions as 1x, 3x, and 6x damages.7 As Lontzek et al. (2015) indicates, sensitivity
analysis is hardly a perfect substitute for formally modeling climate-damage uncertainty in an
OLG setting, which is our major near-term research goal.8 In our 6x BAU simulation, damages
are initially 1 percent of output, peaking at 18.8 percent in year 220. The BAU course of dirty
energy production and the extent of reserve exhaustion are quite similar for all three (1x, 3x,
and 6x) damage functions.
With our baseline, Nordhaus (2017) damage function, the optimal, uniform welfare increas-
ing (UWI) carbon tax starts at $30, rises at 1.5 percent per year and raises the welfare of all
current and future generations by 0.73 percent on a consumption-equivalent basis.9 Sharing
the efficiency gains from our two-part carbon policy (an initial tax plus its annual growth rate)
evenly requires taxing future generations by as much as 8.1 percent and subsidizing early gener-
ations by as much as 1.2 percent of the present value of their remaining or total lifetime future
6Our model predicts what it simulates – a simultaneous end to the extraction of coal, oil, and gas.
7Nordaus(2017)’ specification for damages as share of GDP is Dt = 1   1
1+⇡1TAt +⇡2(TAt )
2 with parameters
values ⇡1 = 0, ⇡2 = 0.00236, where the term TAt references the Celsius change since 1900 in global mean surface
temperature. The reference, below, to an "mx Damage Function" means we set ⇡2 to 0.00236 times m.
8With uncertaintly, the optimal UWI carbon tax will be higher to insure future generations against extreme
carbon damage. Indeed, a positive carbon tax would likely be warranted even were carbon damage, on average,
negative.
9This is relative to consumption under BAU. I.e., each generation’s utility gain is equivalent to raising their
BAU consumption in each year of their remaining (in the case of current generations) or full lives (in the case
of future generations) by 0.73 percent.
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consumption. Without such redistribution, the carbon tax constitutes a win-lose policy with
those now alive experiencing up to a 0.84 percent welfare loss and those born in the medium
run (in this case, year 235) experiencing up to a 7.54 percent welfare gain. Those born in the
long run benefit by 3.45 percent.
With 6x damages, the optimal UWI initial carbon tax is $70, again rising at 1.5 percent per
year. This policy raises all generations’ welfare by almost 5 percent. However, doing so entails
lump-sum taxes as high as 50.1 percent and lump sum subsidies as high as 10.3 percent of
lifetime consumption. Of note, the carbon tax sans redistribution achieves, in this case, close to
a win-win with a) minor welfare losses for current and early generations, but b) gains reaching
45 percent for future generations. The UWI solution is, of course, just one of an infinite number
of Pareto paths. For 1x damages, the optimal path of carbon taxation is robust to how efficiency
gains are shared. For larger damage functions, the sharing method matters to optimal policy.
The optimal carbon tax materially alters the course of dirty energy production. For example,
with 1x damages, coal production is zero for 25 years, positive for 40 years, and zero thereafter.
This means the planet needs to cool down before it is efficient to reuse coal. However, the reuse
of coal, when it occurs, is small. Indeed, our UWI, 1x damages solution entails burning, over
time, only 10 percent of initial coal reserves. As indicated, under business as usual (BAU), i.e.,
no-policy, 70 percent of initial coal reserves are burnt. With 6x damages, UWI policy entails
an immediate end to coal production. Pareto efficient carbon taxation also shortens the period
during which dirty energy is produced from 130 years to 100 years in the 1x case and 80 years
in the 6x case.
Limiting our carbon policy instruments to two (an initial carbon tax and its annual growth
rate), which we do for computational convenience, may understate potential efficiency gains.
But, as discussed, we explored whether having separate short- and long-term carbon-tax growth
rates permit much higher values of the UWI efficiency gain. The answer is no. The optimal short-
and long-term growth rates are identical.
We also calculate optimal two-part carbon policy for our model’s sister ILA model – an
ILA model that differs from our OLG model due solely to the assumption of intergenerational
altruism. The optimal two-part UWI carbon policy in the OLG and ILA models are identical
for the Nordhaus (2017) baseline 1.5 percent time preference rate and damage function (our
1x case). However, the two sets of policies differ dramatically if the time preference rate differs
from 1.5 percent or the damage function is large. Indeed, we provide examples in which opti-
mal carbon taxes a century from now differ by a factor of four between the two frameworks.
Moreover, even, in our baseline calibration, where the time path of the optimal carbon tax is
the same in both frameworks, the OLG UWI solution calls for intergenerational redistribution,
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whereas the ILA model does not.10
We also consider whether delaying the implementation of optimal UWI carbon policy for
20 years materially reduces the UWI gain. The answer is yes – by 44.6 percent with baseline
damages and by 55.4 percent when our damage function is six times larger.
Finally, we measure the uniform efficiency loss from imposing optimal carbon policy were
damages, in fact, zero, which climate skeptics claim. The answer is the potential efficiency losses
from taking precaution are smaller than the potential efficiency gains and far smaller in the 3x
and 6x damage cases.
1.2 Organization of Paper
The climate literature has grown exponentially since Nordhaus (1979) seminal work. Section 2
reviews a very small portion of this literature with apologies to papers we under-emphasize or
overlook. Section 3 presents our model, section 4 describes its calibration, section 5 explains our
solution methods, section 6 presents our results, including their sensitivity to parameter values
and the sharing of efficiency gains, section 7 compares optimal taxation in our model with that
in an infinitely-lived agent (ILA) model where the models differ only along one dimension –
intergenerational altruism, section 8 estimates the cost of imposing carbon policy if damages
are, in fact, zero, and section 9 summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a vast and growing literature on the economics of climate change, much of it emanating
from seminal contributions by Hotelling (1931), Solow (1974a,b) and Nordhaus (1979). The
literature includes theoretical models, optimal tax models, and simulation models, including
Nordhaus (1994, 2008, 2010), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Nordhaus (2017), Stern (2007),
Metcalf (2010, 2014), Gurgel et al. (2011), Rausch et al. (2011), Manne et al. (1995), Plambeck
et al. (1997), Tol (1997, 2002), Tol et al. (2003), and Ortiz et al. (2011). The literature also
incorporates problems of coalition formation, e.g., Bréchet et al. (2011), Nordhaus (2015),
Yang (2008), endogenous economic growth, e.g., van der Zwaan et al. (2002), Popp (2004) and
Acemoglu et al. (2012), and stochastic damages, e.g., Lemoine and Traeger (2014), Lontzek
et al. (2015), Cai et al. (2013), or Brock and Hansen (2017).
The Golosov et al. (2014) paper shows how to cast the problem into a standard calibrated
10This is not a problem for the ILA model since intergenerational redistribution is of no consequence in
that framework. But if the underlying reality is that of selfish generations, the failure to compensate losing
generations means the ILA prescription – Just tax carbon. – will produce a generational win-lose outcome.
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setting and how to decentralize the planner’s solution with carbon taxes. It also introduces
more than one form of dirty energy and considers clean energy’s production as limited due to a
fixed input – two features we adopt in our analysis. Cai et al. (2013), Cai and Lontzek (2018),
Lemoine and Traeger (2014) are major additions to the literature showing that optimal carbon
tax rates can be considerably higher if the extent of future carbon damage is uncertain. The
downside tail of the damage distribution can be particularly important given climate tipping
points. These include losing much of the Amazon rain forest, faster onset of El Niño, the reversal
of the Gulf Stream and other ocean circulatory systems, the melting of Greenland’s ice sheet,
the melting of Siberia’s permafrost, and the collapse of the West Antarctic ice shelf.
There is also a growing literature considering regional effects of climate change and carbon
taxation (see e.g. Nordhaus and Yang (1996), Cai et al. (2018), or Krusell and Smith Jr (2015).
11
Early OlG models that consider resource-extraction and the environment include Howarth
and Norgaard (1990), Howarth and Norgaard (1992), Burton (1993), Pecchenino and John
(1994), John et al. (1995) and Marini and Scaramozzino (1995). Howarth and Norgaard (1990),
Howarth (1991a,b), and Burton (1993).
Howarth and Norgaard (1990), posting a pure exchange model, and Howarth (1991b), using
a two-period OLG model with capital, point out that policymakers can choose among an
infinite number of Pareto efficient paths in the process of correcting negative environmental
externalities. Gerlagh and Keyzer (2001), Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2001) consider the
choice among such Pareto paths and the potential use of trust-fund policies that provide future
generations a share of the income derived from the exploitation of the natural resource. Gerlagh
and van der Zwaan (2001) also point out that demographics can impact the set of efficient policy
paths through their impact on the economy’s general equilibrium.
Howarth (1991a) extended his important prior work to consider, in general terms, how to
analyze economic efficiency in OLG models in the context of technological shocks. Howarth and
Norgaard (1992) introduced damages to the production function from environmental degrada-
tion and studied the problem of sustainable development.12 Rasmussen (2003) and Wendner
(2001) examine the impact of the Kyoto Protocol on the future course of the energy sector.
Wendner (2001) also considers the extent to which carbon taxes can be used to shore up Aus-
11Adding regions, with their own CO2 emissions and damage functions, is another priority for our future
research.
12An alternative approach to incorporating a negative environmental externality is including environmental
quality directly in the utility function. Pecchenino and John (1994) and John et al. (1995) make this assumption
in a discreet-time OlG model. Marini and Scaramozzino (1995) does the same in a continuous-time OLG
framework. The problem of generational equity and sustainable development is also discussed by Batina and
Krautkraemer (1999), Mourmouras (1991, 1993) in a model where energy is renewable.
6
tria’s state pension system. Their papers feature large scale, perfect-foresight, single-country
models. However, they omit climate damage.
The fact that OLG models do not admit unique solutions when it comes to allocating
efficiency gains across agents, including agents born at different dates, has led some economists
to introduce social welfare weights. Papers in this genre include Burton (1993), Calvo and
Obstfeld (1988), Endress et al. (2014), Ansuategi and Escapa (2002), Howarth (1998), Marini
and Scaramozzino (1995), Schneider et al. (2012), Lugovoy and Polbin (2016). These papers
appear to emulate the SP solution.
Our paper is closely related to Bovenberg and Heijdra (1998, 2002), Heijdra et al. (2006).
Their studies consider a continuous time Yaari-Blanchard model and they examine the use of
debt policy to achieve Pareto improvements in the context of adverse climate change.13 However,
their models differ from ours in three important ways. First, they confine environmental damage
to the utility function. Second, they do not model clean as well as dirty energy, with dirty energy
exhausting in the future based on the speed of technological change in the clean energy sector
as well as carbon policy. And third, their study doesn’t provide a quantitative analysis of
optimal policy. Rather it derives conditions on fundamentals, which ensure the existence of
Pareto-improving tax-bond policies.
To achieve our narrow objective, evaluating the potential win-win from carbon policy in a
model that is as close as possible to the literature’s gold standard – Nordhaus (2017), we ignore
fiscal policies, such as income taxes, which distort labor supply and saving decisions. Including
such polices (another future research task) would permit larger win-wins from carbon taxation
were the carbon tax revenue used to reduce such distortionary taxes. The potential to achieve
a "double carbon dividend" was first explored by Goulder (1995),
Rausch (2013) and Rausch and Yonezawa (2018) examine the distributional effects of carbon
taxation in a large scale OLG model. They take as given that a reduction of CO2 emissions is
required and do not model the welfare effects of climate change. Instead, they consider various
forms of revenue recycling and various forms of carbon taxes and compare their impacts on
current and future generations’ welfare.
Finally, we should point out that our model builds on a long line of dynamic CGE OLG
models, which, however, don’t include climate change. Early work on such models include
Summers (1981)’s, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983), Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), and Altig
et al. (2001). These models have been extended over time to include multiple regions, multiple
goods, and demographic change (see, e.g., Börsch-Supan et al. (2006), Kotlikoff et al. (2007),
13Karp and Rezai (2014) also considers a life-cycle model, but explores the degree to which policy-induced
general equilibrium changes in factor and asset prices could affect a Pareto improvement with no direct redis-
tribution across generations. In his model agents live for two periods.
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Fehr et al. (2003), and Benzell et al. (2017)).
3 Our Model
This section presents our model. Section 3.1 discusses its firms and section 3.2, its households.
Section 3.3 demonstrates how the climate is coupled to the economy and section 3.4 discusses
long-run growth.
3.1 Firms







where Yt is final output whose price is normalized to 1, and At, Ky,t, Ly,t, Et reference total
factor productivity and the three inputs used to produce this output – capital, labor, and


















t = pt, (4)
where rt,  , wt and pt reference the real interest rate, the capital depreciation rate, the real
wage rate, and the price of energy, respectively.14
We posit four perfectly substitutable sources of energy: clean energy, St, oil, Ot, gas, Gt,
and coal, Ct. Hence, we can write total energy supply, Et, as
Et = St + OOt + GGt + CCt. (5)
Each type of dirty energy is measured in units of CO2. The parameters O, G, and C are
energy efficiency coefficients.







where Bt, Ks,t, Ls,t, and Ht reference, respectively, the clean energy sector’s productivity level
14As is standard, ↵ and   each lie between zero and 1.
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and its demands for capital, labor, and land. Land is fixed in supply. Profit maximization in












t = wt, (8)
and




t = nt, (9)
where nt is the rental price of land.
Dirty energy producers, indexed by M 2 {O,G, C}, have a finite amount of energy reserves,
RM
t
. The costs of extracting these reserves are increasing in the cumulative amount extracted.
We posit the following functional form for the extraction cost of dirt energy of type M per unit



























The last term ensures that extraction costs approach infinity when reserves approach zero.
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 Mt  0, (14)
where pM
t
is the price of a unit of dirty energy M at time t, ⌧t is the absolute tax per unit of
carbon levied at time t, and T M
t
is the lump-sum rebate of time-t carbon taxes to type M dirty
energy producers.


























where `t,  t and µt are non-negative Lagrange multipliers for the restrictions in equations 12,
13 and 14, respectively.




























3.2.1 Overlapping Generation Households










at+1,j+1 = (1 + rt)at,j + wtlj + Tt,j   Ct,j, (22)
where Ct,j, Tt,j, at,j, lj correspond to consumption, transfers from the government, assets, and
labor supply of generation j at time t, ⇢ is the time preference rate, and   is the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. Total household assets comprise physical capital, the value of dirty
energy firms, the value of land, and government debt.
55X
j=1









where Pt,j is the population of generation j at time t and Dt is government debt.
Government debt evolves according to the following equation:




In implementing the LSRA policy, we set the initial debt level D0 and Tt,j for t > 0, j > 1
to zero. Thus the government pays transfers (possibly negative) to unborn generations in the
year they are born whereas current generations receive transfers in at t = 0.
Total supplies of capital and labor equal the sum of their sectoral demands.




Pt,jlj = Ly,t + Ls,t. (26)




























Pt,j is total population at time t and Ct is per capita consumption.
3.3 Modeling Climate Change’s Negative Externality
Following Nordhaus (1994, 2008, 2010) and Nordhaus and Yang (1996), we assume the following
time-t TFP-damage function, Dt.
Dt = 1 
1






references the change, since 1900, in global mean surface temperature measured
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in Celsius. The damage function alters TFP according to
At = (1 Dt)Zt, (30)
where Zt is an exogenous path of TFP absent climate change.
We adopt Nordhaus’ three-reservoir (the atmosphere, the upper ocean, and the lower ocean)



































are concentrations of CO2 in atmosphere, upper oceans and lower oceans,
and  J is a matrix of parameters.
CO2 in the atmosphere impacts radiative forcing, Ft, according to





























is the Celsius change, since 1900, in the temperature of the the deep oceans.
Per Nordhaus’ formulation, a share of atmospheric carbon is absorbed by the oceans with
the remaining share remaining in the atmosphere forever. Thus, damages from emissions are
hump-shaped, peaking and declining, but not falling to zero.
3.4 Long-run Growth
We assume technology improves according to
Zt = Z0exp(gZt) (34)
and
Bt = B0exp(gBt). (35)
In the long run, after all dirty energy reserves have been extracted, and climate change
12
damage has stabilized, output and clean energy grow at rates gY and gS, determined by
gY =
gZ + (1  ↵   )gB
1  ↵  ✓(1  ↵   ) (36)
and
gS = gB + ✓
gZ + (1  ↵   )gB
1  ↵  ✓(1  ↵   ) . (37)
In addition, the prices of energy and land grow at rates gP and gN determined by
gP =
gZ(1  ✓)  gB 
1  ↵  ✓(1  ↵   ) (38)
and
gN =
gZ + (1  ↵   )gB
1  ↵  ✓(1  ↵   ) ⌘ gY . (39)
It is easy to show that, along with the economy’s balanced growth path, the wage rate grows
at gY and the return to capital is constant. As the growth-rate equations make clear, gZ can
differ from gB without preventing long-run balanced growth. Indeed, our model admits many
different long-run balanced growth paths. These include steady states in which output grows
faster or slower than energy supply. If energy supply grows at a slower rate than output, its
price must fall through time.15
4 Calibration
Our calibration adheres, where possible, to Nordhaus (2017)16. We also calibrate some pa-
rameters based on Golosov et al. (2014). Deviations from Nordhaus (2017) reflect structural
differences between the two models. To begin, our model features autonomous overlapping
generations, whereas the DICE model posits an infinitely-lived SP. Our model has three dirty
energies supplied at an increasing cost. It also has an explicit clean energy sector whose pro-
duction, at a point in time, is limited by complementary natural resources. The DICE model
posits a fixed supply of a single dirty energy, which can be extracted at zero cost. There is no
explicit clean energy sector. The DICE model’s time periods reference five years rather than
our one year.17 Emissions abatement arises, in our model, via the replacement, in the market
place, of clean for dirty energy. In DICE-2016R (henceforth, DICE), the SP determines how
much of the fixed stock of dirty energy reserves to burn and when to burn them before year
15Note, a long-run declining energy price is required to ensure dirty energy extraction ends at a finite date.
16Version DICE-2016R-091916ap. available at: https://sites.google.com/site/williamdnordhaus/dice-rice
17As Cai et al. (2012) make clear, the length, in years, of a period matters to optimal carbon policy.
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500, at which point the DICE model ends. Instead of an end-time condition, our model features
a well defined long-run balanced growth path.18
4.1 Supply-Side Parameters
The capital, labor, and energy shares in the final goods production function, equation(1), are
set to .3, .66, and .04, respectively, as in Golosov et al. (2014). The capital, labor, and land
shares in the production function for clean energy (equation (6) are set at .125, .275, and .6,
respectively.19 The depreciation rate,  , is set at 10 percent. The technology growth rates, gB
and gZ , for clean energy and output, are set to .0064 for gZ and .0137 for gB. These values
produce Nordhaus (2017)’s assumed long-run annual output growth of 2 percent and long-run
-0.5 percent annual decline in the price of energy (actually clean energy, since it is the only
long-run energy source).
Initial world capital equals $223 trillion as in the DICE model. As for the global workforce,
the DICE model assumes that the world’s population rises from 7.403 to 11.5 billion. We
disaggregate DICE’s population dynamics to accommodate our 55-generation population age
structure. Figure 1 summarizes this disaggregation. We calibrate initial levels of TFP in each
sector to accord with DICE’s initial world GDP of $105.5 trillion 2010 USD and the 2010 $550
USD backstop cost per ton of CO2. Our damage function parameters are those in DICE, namely
⇡1 = 0 and ⇡2 = 0.00236.
4.2 Preferences
We set  , the risk aversion coefficient, to 1.45 as in DICE. We assume that households work full
time for their first 40 years and then retire. Moreover, we incorporate the following age-efficiency
labor-earnings profile.
lj = l0e
(4.47+0.033j 0.00067j2), j  40.20 (40)
We also follow the DICE model in assuming, for our base case, a time preference rate, ⇢, of
.015.
18Although our model’s growth path accommodates stable population growth, we follow UN projections,
which assume the planet’s population stabilizes in the medium run.
19I.e., we assume that 60 percent of clean energy output is paid to the fixed input, land, and the rest of clean
energy output is distributed between labor and capital in the same proportion as in the final goods sector.
20This is taken from Benzell et al. (2015).
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Figure 1: Population dynamics
4.3 Dirty Energy Production-Sector Parameters
Based on McGlade and Ekins (2015), we calibrate global available oil reserves at 600 GtC,
global available gas reserves at 400 GtC, and global available coal reserves at 2700 GtC. To
calibrate the extraction cost functions for each of the fossil fuels, we fit third order polynomials
to extraction cost data reported in McGlade and Ekins (2015).21
Finally, we calibrate our energy-efficiency parameters such that, initially, dirty energy con-
stitutes 96 percent of global energy production. We normalize our oil efficiency coefficient, O,
to 1, set G equal to 1.1, and C to 0.35. Based on these values, the time-0 dirty-energy com-
position is 35 percent oil, 20 percent gas, and 45 percent coal, which accords with Boden et al.
(2017).




























+ ✏, where ⇠O1 = 0.807, ⇠O2 = 0.355,
⇠
O
3 =  3.076e 04, ⇠O4 = 1.260e 07, ⇠G1 = 45.405, ⇠G2 = 0.142, ⇠G3 =  1.998e 04, ⇠G4 = 2.304e 07, ⇠C1 = 14.839,
⇠
C
2 = 0.013, ⇠C3 =  1.481e 07, ⇠C4 = 5.106e 11.
15
4.4 Modeling Climate Change
Per Nordhaus (2017), we set initial atmospheric carbon concentration, JA
t
, at 851 GtC, the
initial upper ocean carbon concentration, JU
t
, at 460 GtC, and the initial lower ocean carbon
concentration, JL
t
, at 1740 GtC . We also set the initial lower ocean temperature change (relative
to its 1900 value), TL
t
, at .0068 °C and the initial atmospheric temperature change (again,
relative to its 1900 value), TA
t
, at 0.85 °C.
Cai et al. (2012) suggest how to calibrate our 1-year per period climate model to accord
with DICE’s 5-year per period climate model. Specifically, we simulate the DICE model with
no limitation on emissions and record the resulting temperature path. Next, we interpolate
DICE’s 5-year per period temperature path over single years. Finally, we estimate parameters
for our 1-year climate model that minimize the mean squared percentage error between our
interpolated paths of climate variables over 5-year intervals in our 1-year system and DICE’s
original 5-year system. This produces the following values for the parameter matrices  J and
 T as well as the constant ⌘2. Over 5-year periods our annual system produces climate outcomes














A , ⌘2 = 0.0225. (41)
The parameters ⌘1 = 3.6813 and J = 588 GtC in the radiative forcing equation (32) are those
in the DICE model.
5 Computation Methods
This section presents our methods for solving our OLG model as well as its ILA counterpart.
As in Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), our OLG model’s overall solution combines solving, in an
inner loop, microeconomic equations either analytically or numerically, depending on the time
interval, while iterating, in an outer-loop, over macroeconomic aggregates. Our ILA model’s
solution combines outer-loop macro iteration with an inner-loop multiple shooting algorithm,
where the inner loop is solved, analytically or numerically, depending on the time interval.
5.1 Our OLG Solution Method
Our method starts by guessing the time paths of the aggregate capital stock, Kt, and damages,
Dt. When we apply the LSRA mechanism, we also guess the uniform welfare gain,  . Next,
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we jointly calculate, for each year, factor prices, the sectoral distributions of capital and labor,
output of the final good, CO2 emissions, the production of each type of energy, the prices of
clean energy, oil, gas, and coal, the price of land, the prices of coal, oil, and gas reserves, and,
where relevant, the path of generation-specific LSRA net taxes, with the LSRA net tax imposed
on the oldest generation chosen to achieve intertemporal LSRA budget balance. From the paths
of a factor and non-capital asset prices, we determine the time path of households’ aggregate
supply of capital. The new paths of capital and damages are weighted with the prior paths to
obtain new guesses for these paths in the outer loop of our iteration. If the percentage change
in welfare for the initial oldest generation differs from   (or zero, in the case the initial old don’t
share in the efficiency gains), the guessed value of   is adjusted to produce that outcome.22 We
continue the outer to inner to outer loop iteration until convergence.
Following Nordhaus (2017), we chose parameters for the right-hand-side of equation (38)
that produce, in the long run, a decreasing price of energy. This guarantees that our model’s
economy will never extract all dirty energy reserves, i.e., extraction will endogenously stop at
time T . Since dirty energy reserves will always be positive,  M
t
for all M will always equal zero.




= 0 and the variables  M
t
.




✓ (1   ) + ↵(1  ✓)Kt, (42)
Ks,t =
(1  ↵   )✓
✓ (1   ) + ↵(1  ✓)Kt, (43)
Ly,t =
 




' (1  ↵) +  (1  ')Lt. (45)
In the solution algorithm, we set two dates, T2 and T1. T2 is the year by which we assume
the model has reached, to a very high degree of precision, its long-run balanced growth path.
T1 > T is a year sufficiently high to assure that dirty energy extraction has stopped. T2   T1
must be quite large because atmospheric carbon depreciates very slowly in our model. Our
algorithm sets T2 at 2999 (3000 years from t=0). We typically set T1 to 149 in running the
model.
For t  T1, when each type of dirty energy is potentially being extracted, we need to
22See Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) for a description of this adjustment process.
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solve the following system of equations, which include Kuhn-Tucker conditions permitting the
extractions of some or all of the fossil fuels to equal zero between T1 and T .
Kt = Ky,t +Ks,t, (46)

















t = pt, (50)















1 ✓ ' = wt, (54)
Opt   cOt (ROt )  ⌧t   `Ot + µOt = 0, (55)
Gpt   cGt (RGt )  ⌧t   `Gt + µGt = 0, (56)




























































CtµCt = 0. (66)
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In solving this system of equations, we provide initial conditions for oil, gas and coal reserves







To facilitate our solution, we used the square norm of the Fischer-Burmeister function and




















Ct + µCt  
q
(Ct)2 + (µCt )2
◆2
= 0. (69)
For example, equation 67 equals zero iff Ot   0, µOt   0 and OtµOt = 0. Thus we can
numerically solve the system of equations (46) - (63) and (67) - (69) with interior-point methods.
Our solver is the standard Matlab fmincon function with the ’interior-point’ option and no
bounds on variables. We compute the Hessian and gradients and provide them to fmincon as
sparse matrices, which dramatically speeds up convergence. Our algorithm can be formalized
in the steps stated in Alg. 1.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for solving the OLG model
Require: T1, T2, Bt, Aguesst , K
guess
t , tol, tolK , tolA




3: Solve system of Eq. 46 - 63, 67 - 69 for 0  t  T1 with ’fmincon’ with tolerance tol
assuming that after T1 extraction of dirty energy is zero
4: Solve system of Eq. 46 - 63, 67 - 69 for T1 < t  T2 analitically assuming that after T1
extraction of dirty energy is zero




t using household optimal behavior with given
prices, construct Aguesst using dirty energy emissions and climate block equations
6: until kKt  Kguesst k < tolK , kAt   A
guess
t k < tolA
5.2 Our ILA Solution Method











Yt = Kt+1   (1   )Kt + PtCt + cCt (RCt )Ct + cOt (ROt )Ot + cGt (RGt )Gt. (71)
Equation (70) is the standard ILA consumption-growth formula. Equation (71) is the ILA’s
flow budget. To solve the model, we guess the paths of damages, solve equations (46) - (63) and
(67) - (71) using multiple shooting (see (Lipton et al., 1982)), and then update our guessed path
of damages based on the derived path of output. Our shooting algorithm divides the transition
path into m 50 year-long sub periods, t0 < t1 < .. < tm 1 < T2 and guesses the capital stock at
dates t1, .., tm 1, denoted kt1 , .., ktm 1 .
Assuming that the model reaches its steady state at T2, we shoot Ctm 1 with initial condition
ktm 1 , targeting steady state consumption at date T2. Then we shoot Ctm 2 with initial condition
ktm 2 , targeting consumption Ctm 1 and so on. After each consumption shooting round, we
update kt1 , .., ktm 1 and repeat, using simple bisection, until convergence. As with the OLG
solution, we set t1 high enough, typically at 150 years, to ensure dirty energy extraction ends
by that date. Our shooting prior to t1 uses fmincon to solve the relevant system of equations,
namely (46) - (63) and (67) - (71). For intervals between t1 and T2, the equations are solved
analytically for given paths of consumption and capital.
5.3 Accuracy of the Solutions
All results reported below are based on highly accurate numerical solutions. We solve the OLG
model setting the error tolerance – step 6 in Alg. 1 – at 10 6. The residuals in our ILA solutions
are of order ⇠ 10 9.
6 Results
We first examine the magnitude of climate damage absent carbon policy and show the remark-
able ability of such policy to mitigate the problem. Second, we present optimal UWI carbon
policy for our base case and consider its sensitivity to the damage function, the time preference
rate, and the long-run growth rate of the price of energy. Third, we examine the size of the
intergenerational redistribution required to achieve the UWI win-wins. Fourth, we consider how
optimal carbon taxation, including requisite intergenerational redistribution, differs depending
on how efficiency gains are distributed across generations. Fifth, we examine the economic pre-
cision of our optimal tax solution. Next, we consider the efficiency costs of implementing the
optimal carbon tax but with a delay of 20 years. These efficiency costs include those arising
from Sinn (2008)’s Green Paradox. Sixth, we compare optimal UWI carbon policy in our OLG
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model with optimal carbon policy in the analogous ILA model. We point out in this subsection
that our two-part carbon policy – an initial tax and an annual growth rate – appears to achieve
the UWI and ILA optimums were we to consider more fiscal instruments. Seventh, we consider
the efficiency cost of implementing optimal carbon taxation if the carbon skeptics are correct
and there are no damages from climate change. The Appendix presents figures showing the
evolution of all key variables for different damage functions under Business as Usual, imple-
mentation of the carbon tax policies that maximize UWI gains, but leaving out the policies’
associated LSRA transfers and taxes, and implementation of the carbon policies, inclusive of
the LSRA transfers and taxes, which maximize UWI gains.
6.1 Damages Under Business as Usual
Under the BAU-scenario, CO2 concentration in the atmosphere increases over the next 100 years
to about 900 Gt (see figures 4-6 in the Appendix). It then stabilizes and decreases slightly over
the subsequent century. The associated increase in surface temperature over the proximate
century is 4.7 degrees Celsius and almost 6 degrees at its peak. This is consistent with the
more optimistic scenarios used in climate science, in particular with so-called representative
carbon pathways (RCPs) designed RCP4.5 and RCP6, but not with the pessimistic RPC8.523
However, as emphasized by Weitzman (2007), Pindyck (2013), Lontzek et al. (2015), and others,
the extent and timing of temperature rise under BAU is highly uncertain. Again, modeling
this uncertainty is at the top of our future research agenda. Here, however, we simply seek to
understand the Pareto efficiency gains from carbon taxation in a framework that closely mimics
the standard DICE model.
Table 1 shows BAU damages as a percent of GDP for selected years assuming 1x, 3x, and
6x damage functions. It also shows the size of damages but under optimal UWI policy. With
BAU, damages are initially 0.17, 0.51, and 1.01 percent of GDP for the 1x, 3x, and 6x damage-
function cases, respectively. In year 200, damages in the three cases are 7.70, 18.77, and 29.55
percent of output. Paradoxically, with higher damages, the temperature increase is actually
smaller. In the 6x case, for example, the peak temperature increase is 4.5 degrees in year 99.
There are two reasons. First, damages are so large in the 6x case that they limit future output,
which limits future emissions. Second, the clean energy sector is assumed to operate with no
damage, giving it a greater comparative advantage the larger the extent of the damages. The
table also shows that the optimal UWI carbon policy is remarkably effective in reducing peak
damages. Peak damages are 2.92 percent, not 7.72 percent of GDP in the 1x case. They are 5.52
percent, not 18.78 percent of GDP in the 3x case. Moreover, they are 8.62 percent, not 29.55
23See Rogelj et al. (2011)
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percent of GDP in the 6x case. Thus, the UWI policy reduces peak damages by 62.2 percent,
70.6 percent, and 70.8 percent in the 1x, 3x, and 6x cases, respectively.
Assuming 1x damages, atmospheric CO2 rises under the optimal UWI policy slightly over
the next 70 years and then decreases. The reason? CO2 concentration stays around 5000 Gt
under the policy rather than rising to 9000 Gt. Moreover, the rise in temperature is considerably
slower than under BAU. Despite the drastic reduction in CO2 emissions, the average surface
temperature still rises by about 4 degrees over the next 125 years under the optimal UWI carbon
policy. Nevertheless, given our damage function, the resulting damages are much smaller. As
opposed to an almost 8 percent long-run permanent decline in TFP, the long-run TFP reduction
is limited to roughly 3 percent. This long-run difference of 5 percent of GDP provides the scope
for our calculated UWI gain.24 Assuming 6x damages under optimal taxation, total CO2 in
the atmosphere stays below 4000 Gt. The associated increase in temperature is only about 2.5
degrees – close to the goal of the Paris accord (see figures 10-12 in the Appendix).
Table 1: Damages as Percent of GDP under BAU and Optimal UWI, by Year
t=0 t=10 t=50 t=100 t=150 t=200 t=250 t=300
1x, BAU 0.17 0.29 1.77 5.08 7.28 7.70 7.72 7.65
1x, UWI 0.17 0.27 1.03 2.45 2.87 2.92 2.89 2.83
3x, BAU 0.51 0.87 5.09 13.49 18.01 18.77 18.79 18.62
3x, UWI 0.51 0.79 2.56 4.93 5.48 5.52 5.44 5.34
6x, BAU 1.01 1.72 9.58 23.05 28.69 29.55 29.53 29.27
6x, UWI 1.01 1.55 4.66 7.99 8.61 8.62 8.49 8.31
BAU - Business as Usual, UWI - Uniform Welfare Increase, 1x, 3x, and 6x references models with damage
functions equal to the Nordhaus (2017) function, 3 times that function, and 6 times that function.
6.2 Optimal Uniform Welfare Improving Carbon Policy
Table 2 presents our optimal UWI carbon policies under alternative assumptions. The second
row is our base case. It assumes Nordhaus (2017)’s 1.5 percent time preference rate and his
long-run negative .5 percent energy-price growth rate. The optimal initial energy tax, ⌧0, is
$30 per cubic ton of CO2, rising at a rate, g⌧ , of 1.5 percent per year. With 3x and 6x damage
functions, the initial optimal carbon tax is $50 and $70, respectively. However, the tax’s optimal
growth rate remains 1.5 percent.
24The crucial reason for the relatively large increase in temperature permitted under the optimal policy
compared, for example, with the Paris accord, which vowed to limit the rise in surface temperature to 1.5
to 2 degrees, lies in the Nordhaus (2017) damage function. With this function, a 4-degree increase in average
temperature leads to major, but still moderate long-run damages.
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The UWI efficiency gain,  , is 0.73 percent. With 3x damages, it is 2.58 percent. Moreover,
with 6x damages, it is 4.69 percent. Even a 0.73 percent gain is significant. It is equivalent to
adopting no policy but raising, under BAU, each current and future generation’s consumption
in each future year by 0.73 percent. The close to 5 percent efficiency gains for all generations
for all time is massive, reflecting the severity of damages in the 6x case. The first row of table
2 considers the lowest time preference rate, namely 0.8 percent, for which our solution method
converges for all three damage functions. Our optimal two-part carbon policy does not change
in the 1x case when we set ⇢ to 0.8 rather than 1.5. The initial tax, but not the tax’s growth
rate, does rise with higher damages – from 50 to 60 in the 3x damage case and from 70 to 80
in the 6x damage case.
There is considerable sensitivity in the base case to increases in ⇢ to 3 percent, with the
base-case initial tax dropping from $30 to $10 and the tax’s annual growth rate doubling to 3
percent. Higher damage functions entail lower initial taxes as well, but no higher growth rates.
The size of ⇢ makes a significant difference in the size of the UWI efficiency gains. In the
1x case, the gain is 1.07 percent, 0.73 percent, and 0.23 percent when ⇢ is 0.8 percent, 1.5
percent, and 3.0 percent, respectively. In the 6x case, the corresponding gains are 5.58 percent,
4.69 percent, and 4.64 percent. The last three rows of the table show that the smaller or larger
percentage annual declines in energy’s long-run price make no difference to the optimal policy
and no material difference to the size of UWIs.
Table 2: Optimal Uniform Welfare Improving Carbon Policy
1x Damage Function 3x Damage Function 6x Damage Function
⇢ gP ⌧0 g⌧   ⌧0 g⌧   ⌧0 g⌧  
0.8% -0.5% $30 1.5% 1.07% $60 1.5% 3.25% $80 1.5% 5.58%
1.5% -0.5% $30 1.5% 0.73% $50 1.5% 2.58% $70 1.5% 4.69%
3% -0.5% $10 3% 0.23% $40 1.5% 1.26% $50 1.5% 4.64%
1.5% -0.1% $30 1.5% 0.70% $50 1.5% 2.52% $70 1.5% 4.58%
1.5% -1% $30 1.5% 0.72% $50 1.5% 2.60% $70 1.5% 4.74%
1.5% -2% $30 1.5% 0.65% $50 1.5% 2.46% $70 1.5% 4.61%
⇢ references the time preference rate, gP the long-run annual percentage change in the price of energy, ⌧0 the
initial carbon tax, g⌧ the growth rate of the carbon tax, and   the welfare gain measured as the equivalent
percentage increase in consumption under BAU needed to achieve the welfare gain under the optimal UWI
policy.
23
6.3 Size of Intergenerational Redistribution Required to Achieve UWI
Table 3 considers, under the heading "Transfers", the size of the net lump-sum transfers re-
quired, in the 1x, 3x, and 6x cases to affect each case’s uniform percentage rise in welfare. The
net transfers are expressed as a percentage of remaining lifetime consumption in the case of
current cohorts and as a percent of the present value of total lifetime consumption in the case of
those born in the future. The columns with the headings   show the welfare changes that would
arise if we impose the optimal carbon policy but engage in no intergenerational redistribution.
Consider, first, the results in the third column. They show that if we just impose a 30 carbon
tax and let it rise at 1.5 percent annual, but do not redistribute across generations to achieve
the associated 0.73 percent UWI, we end up with losers as well as winners. In this case, first,
older generations benefit due to the rise in the price of energy, which increases the value of their
dirty energy reserves, leaving them better off despite paying more for energy in their remaining
years. For example, those in their last year of life at the time of the policy experience a 4.52
percent welfare gain. For future generations, there are also far more substantial welfare gains
than 0.73 percent. Indeed, those born in the year 200 are better off by 7.50 percent. However,
the failure to redistribute hurts initial young generations and those born in the first three or so
decades after the policy is imposed. Their maximum welfare loss amounts to roughly 1 percent.
Column two shows the net transfers needed to transform what would otherwise be a genera-
tional win-lose outcome to a uniform win-win in our baseline case. There are several interesting
findings here. First, the transfers to all living generations are positive. They are highest for
the oldest current generations who will not live long enough to experience much if any of the
benefits from reduced climate damage.25 Second, those born in the first few decades after the
policy begins also receive compensation. Again, their loss in welfare from facing higher energy
prices exceeds their benefits from lower climate damage. However, the compensation does not
decline uniformly from oldest to youngest among the living and near-term newborn generations.
For example, the net transfer is 0.55 percent for those 15 years old in a year 0, 1.17 percent for
those born in a year 0, and 0.80 percent for those born in a year 15. For those born 35 and more
years after the reform, the uniform win-win policy entails rising and then declining net taxes.
The net tax peaks at roughly 8 percent for those born two to three centuries into the future.
In the very long run, it declines to less than 4 percent. The requisite net tax is smaller in the
long run due to the slow, but steady depreciation of atmospheric CO2. Hence, generations born
far into the future have much less to gain from reducing carbon emissions since even under
BAU, CO2 emissions end by roughly year 125. Since such long-run generations gain less than
25Asset prices are adversely affected by the rise in interest rates associate with LSRA debt crowding out
caital.
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generations born, say, in year 200, they cannot be taxed as highly in achieving the uniform
welfare improvement.26
As the 3x and 6x results show, future generations must, but are also able to compensate
current generations and those about to be born to a much higher extent when climate change
is an even bigger problem. The higher damage functions mean far higher carbon taxes and,
consequently, far higher short-term energy prices (see figures 7-9 and 10-12 in the Appendix).
With a 6x damage function, generations born in year 200 face a 50.13 percent tax, again
measured as a share of their BAU consumption. However, it would, relative to BAU, leave them
and all other generations, on balance, 4.69 percent better off. Of course, future generations would
greatly prefer letting earlier generations impose the UWI optimal carbon policy, but without
any compensation. For newborns in year 200, this would produce a 45.04 percent utility increase
– almost ten times the utility gain when efficiency gains are evenly distributed to each and all.
The magnitude of the transfers and taxes needed to achieve the UWI with 6x damages speaks
to the political challenges in its implementation. Today’s youngsters would, for example, need
to receive a roughly 10 percent of BAU consumption transfer each year through the rest of their
lives, whereas those born some four decades later would be required to pay taxes of the same
magnitude.
Our LSRA mechanism can be viewed as a non-distortionary deficit policy in which the
government cuts taxes in a lump sum manner for early current and newborn generations based
on the figures in the table and then raises the net tax, again, as indicated, to service the
associated debt. The size of the debt to GDP ratio required to effect the win-win is significant
even for the 1x damage case. The LSRA’s debt to GDP ratio is 0.52 in year 50, 0.78 in year 100,
0.82 in year 200, 0.70 in the year 1000, stabilizing at 0.48 in the long run in 1x damage function
case. The LSRA’s debt to GDP ratio is 1.03 in year 50, 1.22 in year 100, 1.19 in year 200, 1.11
in the year 1000, stabilizing at 0.89 in the long run in 3x damage function case. Moreover, the
LSRA’s debt to GDP ratio is 1.31 in year 50, 1.34 in year 100, 1.24 in year 200, 1.22 in the
year 1000, stabilizing at 1.12 in the long run in 6x damage function case.
6.3.1 Sensitivity of Optimal Carbon Policy to Intergenerational Sharing of Effi-
ciency Gains
Table 4 considers the sensitivity of optimal carbon policy to alternative ways to share efficiency
gains. In addition to first row’s UWI , we consider allocating all efficiency gains uniformly to
either the born (those alive in year zero) or the unborn (those born after year zero). In the 1x
26This statement is relative to the conventional formulation of climate damage. It would not hold were we to
incorporate, as we intend in future work, climate tipping points that impose permanent damage on the economy.
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case, the optimal carbon policy is invariant to the manner of efficiency-gain sharing. In the 3x
and 6x cases, the initial tax, but not the carbon tax growth rate, depends on the sharing rule.
The largest discrepancy arises in the 6x case. When the gains are allocated to the born, the
optimal initial tax is $60. It is one third, i.e., $20 larger when the gains are shared just among
the unborn.27 One would expect welfare gains to be more significant when spread over fewer
generations. This is what table 2 shows for the 1x and 3x cases. In the 1x case, the welfare
gains are 0.73 percent with uniform sharing, 1.79 percent with sharing among the born, and
1.20 percent with sharing among the unborn case. In the 6x case, the corresponding percentages
are 4.69, 8.90, and 9.22. In this case, the larger gain to the unborn may reflect the larger size
of the climate damage in the BAU. Table 5 compares LSRA transfers and taxes under the
three methods of sharing the efficiency gains. Both the transfers and taxes are largest when the
efficiency gains are distributed uniformly to the born, next largest when they are distributed
uniformly to both the born and unborn, and smallest when they are distributed to the unborn.28
27This appears to reflect the lower path of interest rates when the efficiency gains are distributed just to the
unborn. The switch from distributing the gains from the born to the unborn leads the LSRA to accumulate a
smaller debt, which means more capital and a lower interest rate at each future date. This makes the present
value cost of compensating initial generations (the born) lower, permitting a higher initial carbon tax.
28There are many factors at play in determining these figures, including the extent of damages, the degree of
capital’s crowding out from the LSRA debt policy, and the size of each cohort’s consumption, since the taxes
and transfers gains are measured as consumption equivalents.
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Table 3: LSRA Net Transfer as Share of the Cohort’s Present Value of Remaining or Total Life-
time Consumption and Policy-Induced Percentage Welfare Change that Would Occur Absent
Net Transfers
1x Damage Function 3x Damage Function 6x Damage Function
Birth year Transfers No Tranfers   Transfers No Tranfers   Transfers No Transfers  
-54 1.17 4.52 1.96 5.36 2.51 6.13
-45 1.14 4.50 2.03 5.29 2.72 6.05
-35 1.09 3.17 2.52 3.67 3.58 4.31
-25 0.97 0.97 3.75 1.04 5.63 1.41
-15 0.55 -0.28 6.01 -0.40 9.38 -0.07
-5 0.60 -0.83 6.46 -0.87 10.26 -0.40
0 1.17 -0.89 1.96 -0.82 2.51 -0.22
5 1.09 -0.94 1.60 -0.69 1.78 0.14
15 0.80 -0.82 0.48 0.08 -0.37 1.75
25 0.37 -0.51 -0.99 1.27 -3.24 4.10
35 -0.15 -0.08 -2.75 2.73 -6.72 7.00
45 -0.73 0.40 -4.77 4.45 -10.78 10.45
55 -1.36 0.92 -7.07 6.43 -15.41 14.40
100 -5.33 4.56 -19.37 17.37 -38.53 34.40
200 -8.05 7.50 -26.39 24.23 -50.13 45.04
300 -7.98 7.48 -26.06 24.05 -49.40 44.60
400 -7.74 7.29 -25.19 23.38 -47.67 43.32
500 -7.45 7.06 -24.16 22.59 -45.67 41.80
1000 -5.96 5.83 -18.98 18.49 -35.61 34.07
1500 -4.81 4.88 -15.06 15.33 -28.06 28.13
2000 -4.02 4.21 -12.39 13.15 -22.94 24.04
2500 -3.49 3.75 -10.60 11.67 -19.55 21.29
The UWIs (the   values with transfers) are 0.73, 2.58, and 4.69 percent with 1x, 3x, and 6x damage functions,
respectively. Transfers reference the LSRA net payment expressed as a present value of the cohort’s remaining
or total present value of lifetime consumption under the optimal policy, which are needed, under the optimal
policy, to deliver the UWI gain relative to the cohort’s remaining or lifetime utility under BAU. No-Transfers
  references the welfare gain measured as the equivalent percentage increase in consumption under BAU
needed to achieve the welfare gain under the optimal UWI policy were the policy to be imposed without its
LSRA net payments.
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Table 4: Optimal Carbon Tax Policy Under Alternative Ways to Share Efficiency Gains*
1x Damage Function 3x Damage Function 6x Damage Function
⌧0 g⌧   ⌧0 g⌧   ⌧0 g⌧  
Uniform 30$ 1.5% 0.73% 50$ 1.5% 2.59% 70$ 1.5% 4.69%
Born 30$ 1.5% 1.79% 40$ 1.5% 5.44% 60$ 1.5% 8.90$
Unborn 30$ 1.5% 1.20% 50$ 1.5% 4.70% 80$ 1.5% 9.22%
*⇢ = 1.5%, gP =  0.5%
Table 5: LSRA Net Transfer at Time 0 or at Birth as Share of the Present Value of Consumption
under Alternative Redistribution Policies (in percents)
1x Damage Function 3x Damage Function 6x Damage Function
Birth year UWI UWB UWU UWI UWB UWU UWI UWB UWU
-54 1.17 1.93 0.62 1.96 3.74 0.02 2.51 5.07 -0.86
-45 1.14 1.79 0.68 2.03 3.54 0.39 2.72 4.91 -0.12
-35 1.09 1.81 0.58 2.52 4.13 0.88 3.58 5.77 0.79
-25 0.97 2.16 0.13 3.75 6.33 1.36 5.63 8.75 1.64
-15 0.55 2.92 -1.16 6.01 11.17 1.46 9.38 15.22 1.83
-5 0.60 3.24 -1.31 6.46 12.27 1.25 10.26 16.97 1.54
0 1.17 1.95 0.61 1.96 3.79 -0.02 2.51 5.12 -0.93
5 1.09 0.15 1.68 1.60 -1.72 4.03 1.78 -3.98 6.75
15 0.80 -0.08 1.36 0.48 -2.70 2.83 -0.37 -6.07 4.49
25 0.37 -0.46 0.90 -0.99 -4.06 1.30 -3.24 -8.89 1.56
35 -0.15 -0.96 0.36 -2.75 -5.73 -0.47 -6.72 -12.33 -1.92
45 -0.73 -1.54 -0.22 -4.77 -7.72 -2.43 -10.78 -16.42 -5.91
55 -1.36 -2.19 -0.83 -7.07 -10.05 -4.62 -15.41 -21.22 -10.36
100 -5.33 -6.26 -4.75 -19.37 -22.37 -16.43 -38.53 -44.98 -32.79
200 -8.05 -9.02 -7.43 -26.39 -29.52 -23.18 -50.13 -57.07 -43.91
300 -7.98 -8.96 -7.36 -26.06 -29.22 -22.86 -49.40 -56.37 -43.16
400 -7.74 -8.71 -7.12 -25.19 -28.36 -22.01 -47.67 -54.64 -41.44
500 -7.45 -8.42 -6.83 -24.16 -27.34 -21.01 -45.67 -52.61 -39.45
1000 -5.96 -6.90 -5.36 -18.98 -22.19 -15.99 -35.61 -42.41 -29.56
1500 -4.81 -5.74 -4.23 -15.06 -18.27 -12.19 -28.06 -34.69 -22.18
2000 -4.02 -4.93 -3.44 -12.39 -15.58 -9.61 -22.94 -29.43 -17.21
2500 -3.49 -4.39 -2.92 -10.60 -13.78 -7.89 -19.55 -25.93 -13.93
UWI - uniform welfare improving, UWB - uniform welfare improving of born generations, UWU - uniform
welfare improving of unborn generations
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6.3.2 Economic Precision
Tables 6, 7, and 8 tell us about the cost of setting carbon policies that differ from the absolute
optimum.29 For all three damage functions, the message is clear. The growth rate of the tax is
more important than its initial value. For example, an initial $10 tax will deliver close to the
same UWI gain or at least a relatively high UWI gain if its annual growth rate is 4.5 percent.
Moreover, starting the initial tax $10 below the optimum will not materially impact the size of
the uniform efficiency gain. With 6x damages, the initial tax can start $30 from its optimum
and still deliver close to 98 percent of the UWI gain. What about setting the optimal initial
tax, but keeping it fixed? In the 1x case, this lowers the UWI gain by 27.4 percent. In the 6x
case, it lowers it by only 4.1 percent.
The three tables also point to a surprisingly effective alternative carbon policy, namely
starting with a high carbon tax and having it decline through time to zero. Take the 6x case.
An initial $90 tax declining at 1.5 percent per year delivers a UWI gain of 3.809 percent. This
is within 20 percent of the gain from the optimal policy.
Why would a high initial carbon tax that falls through time make sense? The answer is
that there are two ways to limit the burning of fossil fuels. The first is to make the net-of-tax
value of burning coal, oil, and gas sufficiently low relative to their extraction costs that reducing
production makes sense. This is the case of a low, but rising carbon tax. It does not immediately
shut off CO2 emissions. It slows them down and shuts them off sooner than would otherwise be
the case. This first mechanism involves limiting the burn over time to an increasing degree. The
second mechanism is to give dirty energy producers an incentive to slow down their burning
of fossil fuels not by making the return to production lower, but by raising the gain from
deferring production. An initially quite high, but a declining carbon tax, provides the incentive
to produce less in the present and more in the future. Implementing a high initial, but declining
tax may be politically more palatable than starting with a lower tax that rises. However, the
transfers to initial and early generations and the taxes on future generations needed to achieve
the UWI optimum is very similar to what arises when the tax starts low, but rises.
6.3.3 The Efficiency Cost of Delay
As stressed by Sinn’s Green Paradox Sinn (2012) and the large literature, e.g, Van der Ploeg
and Withagen (2015), it spawned, a delay in implementing carbon policy can lead dirty energy
producers to "use it or lose it," thus accelerating the extraction of fossil fuels.30 Unlike a model
29In searching over optimal policy, we used a grid with a step of $ 10 per ton of CO2 for the initial tax and
a step of 1.5% for it’s growth rate.
30This point was stressed, recently, in Kotlikoff et al. (2016) in conjunction with the Paris Accord.
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Table 6: Welfare Gains with 1x Damage Function.
⌧0
g⌧ -1.5% 0% 1.5% 3.0% 4.5%
10 0.165 0.254 0.451 0.623 0.612
20 0.268 0.422 0.682 0.695 0.524
30 0.336 0.527 0.726 0.602 0.362
40 0.381 0.586 0.661 0.509 0.2
50 0.409 0.612 0.629 0.397 0.032
60 0.425 0.614 0.579 0.272 -0.142
70 0.431 0.599 0.513 0.138 -0.317
80 0.429 0.572 0.433 -0.004 -0.493
90 0.42 0.536 0.343 -0.151 -0.667
Table 7: Welfare Gains with 3x Damage Function
⌧0
g⌧ -1.5% 0% 1.5% 3.0% 4.5%
10 0.5 0.741 1.207 1.69 1.939
20 0.87 1.314 1.996 2.38 2.418
30 1.151 1.733 2.433 2.548 2.399
40 1.372 2.032 2.578 2.518 2.295
50 1.548 2.236 2.585 2.458 2.171
60 1.689 2.369 2.573 2.376 2.032
70 1.802 2.449 2.542 2.276 1.881
80 1.891 2.49 2.494 2.162 1.725
90 1.961 2.505 2.432 2.036 1.566
with zero extraction costs, our increasing extraction costs places a natural brake on the Green
Paradox problem, but it doesn’t eliminate it. To assess the magnitude of the problem in our
model, we calculated the optimal two-part UWI carbon policy, but starting in year 20 rather
than in year 0. Even though the policy start date is later, the UWI gains are provided, as before,
to all generations alive or still to be born as of time 0. In the case of 1x damages, the year-20
20 UWI optimal tax starts at $50 ($20 higher than the starting tax were the optimal policy to
start at time 0) and grows thereafter at 1.5 percent (the same rate as starting at time 0). This
is higher by $10 than the optimal tax would have been in year 20 were it enacted starting in
year 0. For the 6x damage case, the optimal tax starting in year 20 is $140 ($70 larger than
the optimal year-0 $70 value), again growing at the same 1.5 percent. This is $46 higher than
its year-20 value under the optimal UWI policy starting in year 0. The message, then, is that
when carbon taxation is delayed, the tax needs to start at a higher value than would otherwise
30
Table 8: Welfare Gains with 6x Damage Function
⌧0
g⌧ -1.5% 0% 1.5% 3.0% 4.5%
10 0.922 1.336 2.038 2.757 3.237
20 1.625 2.389 3.433 4.146 4.387
30 2.168 3.161 4.281 4.568 4.505
40 2.602 3.711 4.585 4.609 4.475
50 2.953 4.089 4.641 4.61 4.409
60 3.239 4.338 4.674 4.58 4.318
70 3.47 4.494 4.685 4.524 4.207
80 3.658 4.586 4.675 4.448 4.084
90 3.809 4.635 4.648 4.355 3.952
be the case.
Thanks to waiting too long to limit emissions and to the exacerbating influence of the Green
Paradox, UWI gains are reduced considerably by delay. In the 1x case, the UWI gain is 0.402
percent versus 0.726 percent. In the 6x case, the UWI gain is 2.09 percent versus 4.69 percent.
In percentage terms, a 20-year delay reduces the efficiency gains by 44.6 percent in the 1x case
and 55.4 percent in the 6x case. The message here is that waiting too long to address climate
change is not only inefficient. It also reaches an economic tipping point where the UWI gains
are potentially too small to achieve consensus on taking action.
7 Comparison of Optimal Carbon Policy – OLG Versus
ILA
Standard integrated assessment models, e.g. Nordhaus (1994, 2008, 2010) and Golosov et al.
(2014), determine the optimal time path of CO2 emissions that maximize the welfare of a
social planner (SP). The SP in these studies may be proxying for a model of infinitely lived
agents (ILAs) whose government has a sufficient fiscal instrument to achieve the SP solution.
An example, in this regard, is Golosov et al. (2014) who derives (decentralize) the optimal ILA
carbon-tax policy based on the solution to the corresponding SP’s problem. The ILA framework
implicitly assumes that all currently living agents are homogenous and, as mentioned, altruistic
in the sense that consumption of their children enters their utility function.31
One can also obviously consider a setting in which generations are selfish, but are controlled
31Indeed, the standard ILA formulation assumes that the utility of children enters the parent’s utility function
in the same way as their consumption.
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by an SP. The SP would effect an efficient solution, but not necessarily a Pareto improvement
relative to the no-SP equilibrium. Alternatively, one can contemplate a Pareto-constrained
social planner who achieves alternative Pareto-improving, efficient equilibriums, such as our
maximum UWI solution. In contrast to our UWI solution, which is limited due to the consid-
eration of just two policy instruments, an SP would, in effect, have an unlimited number of
instruments at her disposal. As in Golosov et al. (2014), one could take the SP’s UWI solution
as a benchmark and examine whether it can be decentralized with time-varying carbon and
generation-specific lump-sum taxes. We reserve this exercise for future research.
This said we have explored, for our base case, using three rather than two fiscal instruments
to improve on our UWI efficiency gain. The three instruments are an initial carbon tax, a
short-run (50-year) growth rate, and a long-run (post year 50) growth rate. We find no change
in the optimal UWI policy, i.e., the optimal short-term growth rate is the same as the long-
term growth rate. The ILA optimal carbon policy is also unchanged when we add a short-term
growth rate.32
Given the frequent reliance on the ILA for analyzing optimal carbon taxation, a natural
question is whether the optimal two-part carbon policy differs in our OLG and ILA models,
where the ILA model differs from the OLG model only through its assumption of intergenera-
tional altruism. Table 9 presents our comparison. Consider first rows 3 and 4. They show optimal
UWI OLG and ILA carbon policy assuming the 1.5 percent time preference rate and damage
function assume by Nordhaus (2017). The optimal two-part policies are identical, namely a $30
initial tax growing annually at 1.5 percent.33 However, since the ILA solution does not include
the LSRA, it doesn’t ensure a Pareto improvement. This, indeed, is what we see in the third
column of table 3 – benefits to older and future generations at a cost to young and early genera-
tions. Moreover, the UWI OLG and ILA policies differ significantly when time preference rates
are larger or smaller or when the damage function is more significant. Consider, for example,
the 1x case with a time preference rate of 0.8 percent. The ILA optimal tax, in this case, is
perpetually one third larger than the OLG maximizing UWI carbon tax. For a higher, 3 percent
time preference rate, the OLG and ILA initial optimal taxes are both $10, but the tax rises
at 3 percent annually in the OLG case and at 1.5 percent annually in the ILA case. After 50
years, the OLG carbon tax is twice the ILA carbon tax. After a century, it is 4.4 times larger.
32In the 1x damage case, the initial tax remains at $30 and the optimum short-term growth rate as well as
long-term growth rates are both 1.5 percent, i.e., the extra policy instrument makes no difference. With 6x
damages, the two-part policy entailed a $90 initial tax growing at 3 percent per year. With three instruments,
the initial tax is again $90 with a short-term 3.0 percent growth rate followed by a 1.5 percent long-term growth
rate. But the welfare gain with the third instrument is 7.2256 percent compared with 7.2255 percent without
it. This trivial difference is within the range of computation precision.
33This surely reflects, in part, the fact that our BAU delivers an interest rate path that’s comparable to that
in the ILA equilibrium.
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As another example of the significant differences in carbon policy prescriptions emanating from
the two models, consider the 6x case with a time preference rate of 0.8 percent. The optimal
ILA carbon tax starts at $140 and rises at 3 percent annually. In the OLG model, the carbon
tax starts at $80 and rises at 1.5 percent annually. Once again, the difference in the two optimal
carbon taxes rises dramatically through time.
One reason the OLG and ILA optimal policies may differ so much is their different general
equilibrium paths. In the ILA, the economy’s long-run interest rate is pegged, in significant
part, by the rate of time preference. In the OLG model, the time preference rate matters, but
so does generational policy, including the LSRA’s debt accumulation policy.
As Table 10, the LSRA’s debt policy raises the long-term interest rate. Take our base case.
The interest rate starts at 4.3 percent and under BAU ends up at 4.0 percent. However, when
we maximize the UWI gain, the long run interest rate is 5.4 percent. In the corresponding ILA
simulations, the long-run interest rates are 4.5 percent. For the case of very large damages,
intergenerational transfers and, thus, LSRA debt, must be very large to compensate current
generations for the much higher requisite carbon taxation. With ⇢ at 1.5 percent and a 6x
damage function, the OLG long-run interest rate is 8.5 percent. It is 4.1 percent under BAU
and 4.5 percent under ILA BAU and ILA optimal policy. Clearly, the rise in the interest rate,
which must be paid on the LSRA debt, naturally limits how large the carbon taxes can be
today.
So far we have shown that the choice of model, OLG versus ILA, will, in general, make
a significant difference in determining optimal carbon policy. However, will it matter to the
intergenerational distribution of welfare? The answer is yes, as shown in figures 2 and 3. These
figures show the impact on the time path of current and future generations’ utilities of imposing
ILA "optimums" on the OLG economy with no redistribution across generations to offset utility
losses. If damages are 1x, the optimal ILA solution, when the ILA agents are presumed to have
very low time preference rates, e.g., 0.1 percent, can materially hurt young and early generations.
With 6x damages, the potential harm to such generations is smaller, but non trivial.
33
Table 9: Optimal Carbon Policy – OLG Versus ILA
1x Damage Function 3x Damage Function 6x Damage Function
Model ⇢ ⌧0 g⌧   ⌧0 g⌧   ⌧0 g⌧  
OLG 0.8% $30 1.5% 1.07% $60 1.5% 3.25% $80 1.5% 5.58%
ILA 0.8% $40 1.5% 1.30% $70 3% 5.72% $140 3% 12.38%
OLG 1.5% $30 1.5% 0.73% $50 1.5% 2.58% $70 1.5% 4.69%
ILA 1.5% $30 1.5% 0.49% $70 1.5% 3.15% $90 3% 7.23%
OLG 3% $10 3% 0.23% $40 1.5% 1.26% $50 1.5% 4.64%
ILA 3% $10 1.5% 0.07% $40 1.5% 0.99% $40 3% 2.76%
⇢ references the time preference rate, gP the long-run annual percentage change in the price of energy, ⌧0 the
initial carbon tax, g⌧ the growth rate of the carbon tax, and   the welfare gain measured as the equivalent
percentage increase in consumption under BAU needed to achieve the welfare gain under the optimal UWI
policy in the OLG case or the ILA optimal in the ILA case.
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Table 10: Interest Rates (percent per year)
t=0 t=10 t=50 t=100 t=150 t=200 t=250
OLG, BAU, 1x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 4.3 4.0 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.6
OLG, OP, 1x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 4.2 4.1 3.8 4.4 4.9 5.0 5.0
ILA, BAU, 1x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 4.3 3.6 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7
ILA, OP, 1x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 4.1 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.7
OLG, BAU, 1x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 4.3 4.3 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.0
OLG, OP, 1x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 4.2 4.4 4.2 4.8 5.3 5.4 5.4
ILA, BAU, 1x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.5
ILA, OP, 1x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 4.2 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.5
OLG, BAU, 1x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.4 5.3 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.4 5.4
OLG, OP, 1x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.3 5.4 5.2 5.8 6.2 6.3 6.3
ILA, BAU, 1x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.4 5.3 5.6 5.7 5.9 6.0 6.0
ILA, OP, 1x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.3 5.3 5.7 5.8 6.0 6.0 6.0
OLG, BAU, 6x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 4.2 3.9 2.9 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.6
OLG, OP, 6x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 3.9 4.4 5.0 7.1 8.2 8.4 8.4
ILA, BAU, 6x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 4.2 3.4 2.9 3.0 3.6 3.7 3.7
ILA, OP, 6x DF, ⇢ = 0.8% 3.8 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
OLG, BAU, 6x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 4.2 4.2 3.3 3.4 3.9 4.0 4.1
OLG, OP, 6x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 3.9 4.6 5.3 7.3 8.3 8.5 8.5
ILA, BAU, 6x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 4.2 4.0 3.6 3.7 4.3 4.4 4.5
ILA, OP, 6x DF, ⇢ = 1.5% 3.9 4.0 4.0 4.4 4.4 4.5 4.5
OLG, BAU, 6x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.3 5.2 4.5 4.8 5.3 5.4 5.4
OLG, OP, 6x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.0 5.5 6.2 8.1 9.0 9.2 9.2
ILA, BAU, 6x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.3 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.9 6.0 6.0
ILA, OP, 6x DF, ⇢ = 3% 4.1 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.0
*NP - No Policy, OP - Optimal Policy, DF - Damage Function
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Figure 2: Welfare Gains, OLG with Optimal Taxation vs ILA Solution with 1x Damage Function
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Figure 3: Welfare Gains, OLG with Optimal Taxation vs ILA Solution with 6x Damage Function
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8 The Cost of Imposing Carbon Policy If Damages Are, in
Fact, Zero
Despite the overwhelming scientific evidence of climate change, climate skeptics abound. Hence,
it seems worthwhile to address their view that imposing carbon taxation would be costly with
no benefit. If damagers were, indeed, zero and the government imposed the 1x UWI policy,
the uniform, across all generations, efficiency loss would equal 0.54 percent. With 3x policy, it
would equal 0.87 percent. And with 6x policy, it would equal 1.04 percent. These values are all
smaller or far smaller than the far more likely respective gains of 0.73 percent, 2.58 percent,
and 4.69 percent.
9 Summary and Conclusion
Large-scale modeling of optimal carbon policy has been framed, almost exclusively, in two
ways. The first invokes an omnipotent social planner whose preferences about the treatment
of different generations need bear no connection to actual preferences of either those alive or
those yet to be born. The second assumes that households are infinitely lived, ostensibly due
to altruistic concerns for their descendants. Each approach is problematic. Neither "optimums"
need produce a Pareto improvement if cohorts are selfish. Hence, relying on either approach
can transform the debate about efficient carbon policy from one of a generational win-win to
one of a generational win-lose.
The appropriate framework for studying the carbon externality is surely that of selfish
cohorts who quite naturally ignore the costs their CO2 emissions impose on today’s and tomor-
row’s children. In focusing on generational win-wins, principally the carbon policy producing
the highest uniform welfare gain for all generations, our paper confines optimal carbon taxation
to the province of economics. I.e., we leave aside carbon policies that are "just" based on the
preferences of an assumed social planner or those of agents, all of whom supposedly care about
future generations, but somehow collectively fail to assist them.
When we calibrate the emissions/temperature/damages relationships per Nordhaus (2017),
the optimal carbon tax is 30 per cubic ton of CO2 rising at 1.5 percent per year. With a six-
times worse damage function, the optimal initial carbon tax is 70, also growing at 1.5 percent
per year. In the analogous ILA model, the optimal 1x damage function tax is also 30 rising
at 1.5 percent. With a 6x damage function, it is 90, growing at 3 percent annually. Hence,
optimal OLG UWI and ILA carbon policies can be very different. Moreover, even in the 1x
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case, where the carbon tax path is the same, implementing the ILA optimum, which entails no
intergenerational redistribution, will not be Pareto improving if cohorts are selfish.
In our OLG optimal carbon policy calculations, which include lump-sum redistribution,
the uniform welfare gains with 1x and 6x damage functions are 0.73 percent and 4.69 per-
cent, respectively, measured as consumption compensating variations in the business-as-usual
equilibrium. Achieving these win-win outcomes does, however, require significant redistribution
from future winners and transfers to early losers. Indeed, with 6x damages, the net taxes on
future generations can reach up to half of their annual consumption. This is testimony to the
magnitude of the negative carbon externality.
We have, as mentioned, many important first-order issues to explore in future work – issues
that have already been examined in SP and ILA frameworks and even some steady-state OLG
models. We have excluded these factors here to keep our model simple and to focus on our
key objective – calculating optimal, Pareto-improving carbon taxation and its associated inter-
generational redistribution in a large-scale OLG model that incorporates standard (Nordhaus
(2017)) assumptions about the relationship between carbon emissions, temperature increase
and economic damages.
Our goals for future research are, first and foremost, incorporating uncertainty and deriving
state–specific carbon tax and state-specific intergenerational redistribution that uniformly raise
all generations’ expected utilities. Second is adding multiple regions together with region-specific
damages, some of which may be negative, as well as regional free riding. Third is accounting
for carbon taxation’s regressivity. Doing so requires expanding the model to include multiple
goods, some of which are energy intensive as well as differentially consumed by the poor. It also
requires within-cohort labor earnings heterogeneity. Fourth is incorporating pre-existing fiscal
distortions whose reduction, via the carbon policy, may permit even larger Pareto improvements
– the so-called carbon double dividend.
With inter-generational, intra-generational, inter-regional heterogeneity, pre-existing distor-
tions, and limitations on lump-sum (equivalently, inframarginal) taxes and transfers, achieving
realistic win-win solutions requires careful design of tax-transfer schemes where such schemes
rely either exclusively or primarily on extant fiscal instruments. But calculating such taxes and
transfers within large-scale OLG models seems critical for identifying carbon policy changes
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Appendix 1 Optimal Tax Policy with 1x Damage Function










































Figure 4: Optimal Tax Policy with 1x Damage Function, Part 1*
*Ot - oil, Gt - gas, Ct -coal, ROt -oil reserves, RGt - gas reserves, RCt -coal reserves, JAt - CO2 concentration in
atmosphere (all 7 in GtCO2), St - clean energy production,Et - total energy consumption, Ft - radiative forcing,
gY - steady state growth rate of output, gS - steady state growth rate of clean energy.
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Figure 5: Optimal Tax Policy with 1x Damage Function, Part 2
*TA
t
- global mean surface temperature, Dt - damages, pt - price of clean energy and oil per tCO2, ⌧t -absolute
tax per tCO2, Ct,j -consumption of generation j at time t, gY - steady state growth rate of output, ⇤t -
percentage change in consumption of households that produces the same change in the welfare of a generation
born in period t compared to no policy scenario.
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Figure 6: Optimal Tax Policy with 1x Damage Function, Part 3
* V O
t
- value of oil company, V G
t
- value of gas company, V C
t
- value of coal company, Yt - final output, Kt -
total capital, Ks,t - clean energy sector’s capital, Ky,t - final goods production sector’s capital, wt - real wage
rate, rt - real interest rate, nt - rental price of land, Qt - value of land, gY - steady state growth rate of output.
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Appendix 2 Optimal Tax Policy with 3x Damage Function










































Figure 7: Optimal Tax Policy with 3x Damage Function, Part 1*
*Ot - oil, Gt - gas, Ct -coal, ROt -oil reserves, RGt - gas reserves, RCt -coal reserves, JAt - CO2 concentration in
atmosphere (all 7 in GtCO2), St - clean energy production,Et - total energy consumption, Ft - radiative forcing,
gY - steady state growth rate of output, gS - steady state growth rate of clean energy.
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Figure 8: Optimal Tax Policy with 3x Damage Function, Part 2
*TA
t
- global mean surface temperature, Dt - damages, pt - price of clean energy and oil per tCO2, ⌧t -absolute
tax per tCO2, Ct,j -consumption of generation j at time t. gY - steady state growth rate of output, ⇤t -
percentage change in consumption of households that produces the same change in the welfare of a generation
born in period t compared to no policy scenario.
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Figure 9: Optimal Tax Policy with 3x Damage Function, Part 3
* V O
t
- value of oil company, V G
t
- value of gas company, V C
t
- value of coal company, Yt - final output, Kt -
total capital, Ks,t - clean energy sector’s capital, Ky,t - final goods production sector’s capital, wt - real wage
rate, rt - real interest rate, nt - rental price of land, Qt - value of land, gY - steady state growth rate of output.
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Appendix 3 Optimal Tax Policy with 6x Damage Function










































Figure 10: Optimal Tax Policy with 6x Damage Function, Part 1*
*Ot - oil, Gt - gas, Ct -coal, ROt -oil reserves, RGt - gas reserves, RCt -coal reserves, JAt - CO2 concentration in
atmosphere (all 7 in GtCO2), St - clean energy production,Et - total energy consumption, Ft - radiative forcing,
gY - steady state growth rate of output, gS - steady state growth rate of clean energy.
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Figure 11: Optimal Tax Policy with 6x Damage Function, Part 2
*TA
t
- global mean surface temperature, Dt - damages, pt - price of clean energy and oil per tCO2, ⌧t -absolute
tax per tCO2, Ct,j -consumption of generation j at time t. gY - steady state growth rate of output, ⇤t -
percentage change in consumption of households that produces the same change in the welfare of a generation
born in period t compared to no policy scenario.
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Figure 12: Optimal Tax Policy with 6x Damage Function, Part 3
* V O
t
- value of oil company, V G
t
- value of gas company, V C
t
- value of coal company, Yt - final output, Kt -
total capital, Ks,t - clean energy sector’s capital, Ky,t - final goods production sector’s capital, wt - real wage
rate, rt - real interest rate, nt - rental price of land, Qt - value of land, gY - steady state growth rate of output.
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